Marin v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-79. (Vasquez)

Campodonico v. United States, 222 F.2d 310, 314 (9th Cir. 1955) (holding that the broad definition of gross income includes gambling winnings)

Aubuchon v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-87. (Arbeit)

Wnuck v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 498, 513 (2011) ("There is . . . little advantage to be gained by addressing frivolous arguments, and there are disadvantages that may accrue from doing so. For that reason, litigants who present frivolous arguments should not expect to see them answered in opinions of this Court.")

Aubuchon v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-87. (Arbeit)

Nis Fam. Tr. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 523, 537, 539-41 (2000) (holding that, where taxpayers made only frivolous and groundless arguments and thus failed to assign "justiciable error" to any of Commissioner's determinations, taxpayers were deemed to concede all deficiency adjustments)

Aubuchon v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-87. (Arbeit)

he had reasonable cause. See United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 245-46 (1985) (holding that taxpayer bears the burden of proving reasonable cause and lack of willful neglect)

Whistleblower 6417-20W v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-89. (Urda)

Weiss v. Commissioner, 147 T.C. 179, 196 (2016) ("The IRM lacks the force of law and does not create rights for taxpayers.")

Cottman v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-88. (Way)

United States v. Podell, 572 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1978) ("It is well-settled that a criminal conviction, whether by jury verdict or guilty plea, constitutes estoppel in favor of the United States in a subsequent civil proceeding as to those matters determined by the judgment in the criminal case.")

Cottman v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-88. (Way)

Considine v. United States, 683 F.2d 1285, 1287 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Section 7206(1) (false return), however, does not require any fraudulent intent.")

Cottman v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-88. (Way)

Morse v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-332, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 673, 676 (noting that convictions for filing false tax returns are highly persuasive evidence of intent to evade taxes)

Swain Commr., T.C. Summary Opinion 2026-9. (Guider)

Foley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-242, 2007 WL 2403732, at *2; see also IRM 5.16.1.2.9 ("A hardship exists if a taxpayer is unable to pay reasonable basic living expenses.")

El Deeb v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-101. (Jones)

Bregin v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1097, 1102, 1104-05 (1980) (holding that an overstatement of wage withholding did not constitute a deficiency and was outside the Court's jurisdiction)

Jones v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-99. (Nega)

Oropeza v. Commissioner, 155 T.C. 132, 140 (2020) ("[S]ection 6662(i) does not impose a distinct penalty. It simply increases the rate of the penalty imposed . . . for engaging in a transaction lacking economic substance.")

Jones v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-99. (Nega)

Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Commissioner, 299 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2002) ("When, as here, a taxpayer is presented with what would appear to be a fabulous opportunity to avoid tax obligations, he should recognize that he proceeds at his own peril.")

Facebook, Inc. v. Commr., 167 T.C. No. 12 (2026). (Pugh)

Cloes v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 933, 937 (1982) ("Proper judicial administration demands that there be an end to litigation and that bifurcated trials be avoided.")

Facebook, Inc. v. Commr., 167 T.C. No. 12 (2026). (Pugh)

Litzenberg v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-482, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 413, 417 ("Rule 155 is not an 'open sesame' for either party to get adjustments for issues not raised in the deficiency notice, in the pleadings, in the pre-trial memoranda, or at trial.")

Facebook, Inc. v. Commr., 167 T.C. No. 12 (2026). (Pugh)

." Id. at 392, 399-400; see Dwinnell & Co. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 827, 834 (1960) (interpreting phrase "to the satisfaction of Commissioner" as a question of burden of proof subject to our review)

Allen Shay v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-103. (Fung)

United States v. Horne, 714 F.2d 206, 207 (1st Cir. 1983) (per curiam) ("The provisions in the [IRM] are not codified in the Code of Federal Regulations. Even if they were codified, the provisions [in the IRM] would not be 'mandatory.'")

Whistleblower 6417-20W v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-89. (Urda)

Moreover, "it is 'well-settled' that IRM provisions are 'directory rather than mandatory, are not codified regulations, and clearly do not have the force and effect of law.'"

Pal v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-93. (Lauber)

It is obvious and well settled that distributions from an IRA are taxable unless a specified exception applies.

Estate of Farwell v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-95. (Vasquez)

The Chenery doctrine generally precludes a reviewing court from upholding an agency determination on grounds not invoked by the agency itself.

Cottman v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-88. (Way)

Wright v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 636, 641-42 (1985) ("[T]he Supreme Court held that, for purposes of sections 7201-7207, 'willfully' 'simply means a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.' . . . This definition says nothing about fraud, and requires nothing more than a specific intention to violate the law." (quoting United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976))).

Cottman v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-88. (Way)

Specifically, it has been held that discrepancies of 100% or more between a taxpayer's actual and reported net income for three successive years provide strong evidence of fraudulent intent. See Cooley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-49, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1025, 1032.

Daidone v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-98. (Guider)

Intent may be demonstrated through tacit consent. The "tacit consent rule" holds that the intent to file jointly may be inferred from the acquiescence or tacit approval from the nonsigning spouse. Hennen v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 747, 748 (1961); Okorogu v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2017-53, at *19.

Jones v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-99. (Nega)

In Patel, 165 T.C. at 188, we held that section 7701(o) requires a threshold relevancy determination; "the statute says so, right there, on its face." Relevancy is determined "in the same manner as if [section 7701(o)] had never been enacted." § 7701(o)(5)(C).

Jones v. Commr., T.C. Memo. 2026-99. (Nega)

In Jones I, T.C. Memo. 2025-25, at *50, we held that the alleged loan from CSI to Shor was in fact a constructive dividend. The Shors, in turn, failed to report as income those windfall-that is, "too good to be true"-proceeds of the faux-loan constructive dividend on their 2016 tax return. As we already found, attempting to resurrect the loan by paying it off after receiving the Notice of Deficiency was insufficient to demonstrate a bona fide loan.